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In the 1980s, amid regional controversy over France’s
policies in South Pacific, a debate emerged around the
idea of whether France was simply a sovereign presence
‘‘in’’ the region, or could also be seen as being ‘‘of’’ or
‘‘from’’ the region. It is an important question, as it goes
to the heart of how France wants to be seen in the South
Pacific region, and in the world. If France wants to
remain ‘‘in’’ the Pacific, as is evident from recent official
policy and statements, then the nature of its future
effective presence will be shaped not only by its own
perceptions, but by those of regional countries, about its
status as part ‘‘of’’ the region. Whereas French policies
in the South Pacific led to regional instabilities and even
threatened regional security in the second half of the
last century, in recent years France has been a useful
western ally in the South Pacific. With new regional
uncertainties, including new interest from China, by
seeing itself as a country ‘‘of’’ the region, France may
better be able to maintain an effective sovereign presence
‘‘in’’ the Pacific, at a time when it is addressing the future
of its principal Pacific entities.
K: Regional security, Decolonization, Inde-
pendence, Sovereignty, Self determination, Pacific
Islands Forum
RÉSUMÉ
Dans les années 1980, alors que sa politique dans le
Pacifique Sud est controversée, un débat s’engage sur la
possibilité de percevoir la France non seulement comme
une présence souveraine « dans » mais aussi « de » la
région. Cette question importante révèle comment la
France souhaite être perçue par le Pacifique Sud et,
au-delà, par le reste du monde. Si la France veut rester
« dans » le Pacifique, la nature et l’efficacité de sa pré-
sence comme partie prenante « de » la région dépendent
autant de sa volonté que de celle des pays du Pacifique
Sud. Si dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, la politique
de la France a été une cause d’instabilité et a même pu
menacer la sécurité de la région, la France est récem-
ment devenue un allié occidental utile pour la zone. Alors
que de nouvelles incertitudes apparaissent, liées notam-
ment au rôle de la Chine, la France, en se considérant
elle-même comme étant « de » la région, serait plus à
même de conserver une présence souveraine efficace
« dans » le Pacifique au moment où se pose la question
de l’avenir de ses principales collectivités du Pacifique.
M- : sécurité régionale, insertion économique,
décolonisation, auto-détermination, souveraineté,
indépendance, Forum des îles du Pacifique
« Nous sommes d’ici et de nulle part ailleurs, vous
êtes d’ici mais aussi d’ailleurs. »1 (Kanak indepen-
dence leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou to New Caledonian
pro-France leader Jacques Lafleur, in Fraser, 1990)
When Kanak independence leader Jean-
Marie Tjibaou spoke these words to pro-France
Caldoche leader, Jacques Lafleur, in 1983, in the
midst of turmoil leading to civil war in France’s
South Pacific possession, New Caledonia, he
was no doubt enunciating a key difference
between the local long-term French residents
(the Caldoches) and the indigenous people (the
1. «We are from here and nowhere else; you are from here but also from somewhere else».
* Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University Centre for European Studies, former Australian Consul-General in
Nouméa (2001-2004), denisemfisher@gmail.com
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Kanaks), but at the same time he was making a
generous concession to France, one full of pos-
sibilities. To concede that ‘‘you’’, the French
newcomers from the nineteenth century to the
present, were ‘‘from’’ or ‘‘of’’ the Pacific (the
French word ‘‘de’’ means both), as much as
being ‘‘from’’ or ‘‘of’’ another place, was an
extraordinarily inclusive idea from a preeminent
regional indigenous independent leader. It is a
conciliatory construct that even today presents
France with possibilities for enabling greater
autonomy for its Pacific entities, while main-
taining a continuing role in guaranteeing the
stability of the South Pacific region2.
One strand of academic discussion that emer-
ged in the later 1980s, as regional opposition
to French nuclear testing and decolonization
policies in the South Pacific region gathered
strength, was the idea of whether or not France
with its sovereign presence was just ‘‘in’’ the
region, or whether it could also be construed as
being ‘‘of’’ the region. This remains an impor-
tant idea as it goes to the heart of how France
wants to be seen in the Pacific region, and in
the world. Its own perceptions, and those of
regional countries, about its status, will shape the
future effective role of France in the Pacific.
The question is a relevant one in the next few
years, as a watershed deadline looms in New
Caledonia, France’s pre-eminent South Pacific
entity. After decades of controversy over
demands for independence and greater auto-
nomy, successive statutes, and even civil war
in the 1980s, a temporary settlement in New
Caledonia was negotiated in the Matignon/
Oudinot Accords of 1988, and extended in the
1998 Nouméa Accord. The terms of this Accord
will come to conclusion in the years 2014 to
2018, when a promised referendum on New
Caledonia’s future status must finally be
undertaken. This year, France and the principal
parties in New Caledonia began discussions
about the nature of the French presence there
beyond 2018.
The New Caledonia deadline of 2014-2018
coincides with a number of other deadlines and
developments in its immediate neighbourhood,
known as a ‘‘Melanesian arc of instability’’
embracing Australia’s northeast, including
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu,
and Fiji. After years of violent secessionist
demands from indigenous inhabitants of
copper-rich Bougainville Island, Papua New
Guinea negotiated the Bougainville Peace
Agreement in 2001. This Agreement itself partly
drew on the Nouméa Accord model and specifies
that a referendum for independence will be held
between 2015 and 2020, which more or less coin-
cides with the Nouméa Accord referendum
period in New Caledonia. By that time, too,
regional countries will be defining an end point
for the Pacific Islands Forum-led Regional
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, the
long-term plan set up in 2003 to address violent
insurgency there. And Fiji is currently addres-
sing its own governance issues relating to the
claims of a large indigenous minority and more
recently arrived ethnic groups, not dissimilar to
the challenges facing New Caledonia.
More broadly, the denouement of the Nou-
méa Accord is pending at a time when the old
power balances in the wider Pacific region are
changing, as the new economic powerhouse
China begins to assert its presence, with uncer-
tain consequences. So far, the direct impact of
China’s rise has been limited in the South Pacific
(Dobell, 2007; Hanson, 2008). But, at the same
time as China is seeking natural resources in the
South Pacific and an increasing presence there in
coming years, whether benign or otherwise, the
future of the presence of France, a longstanding,
well-resourced western ally in the region, is open
to question as it becomes the subject of a vote by
the people of New Caledonia.
France ‘‘in’’ the region
The fact of France’s presence ‘‘in’’ the South
Pacific region, through its entities there, is unde-
niable. One of the earliest European countries to
be engaged in the region, France invested exten-
sive national resources in sending official expedi-
tions to the South Pacific well into the nineteenth
century. Its early presence was not without
controversy, and was variously characterized
by a spirit of scientific inquiry; national prestige
and rivalry with others, most notably the
British; and both triumphs and losses (evident in
Bougainville, 1772; La Pérouse, 1788; and see
Dunmore, 1978 and 1997).
By the mid-nineteenth century France had
claimed possession over what remain today
the French entities of French Polynesia, New
Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and uninhabited
Clipperton Island; and, jointly with Britain,
France administered the New Hebrides, which
became independent Vanuatu in 1980.
2. For the purposes of this paper, the South Pacific region refers to Pacific island entities south of the Equator. (The two
regional organizations referred to, the Pacific Islands Forum and Secretariat for the Pacific Community, also include in their
membership some entities north of the Equator.)
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France ‘‘in’’ or ‘‘of’’ the Pacific? Regional contro-
versies of the postwar period
As neighbouring Pacific island countries
began to claim or be endowed with independence
in the second half of the twentieth century,
France resisted decolonization, to become essen-
tially the only resident sovereign European
power in the Pacific south of the Equator by the
early twenty-first century (although the British
retained responsibility for a tiny settlement of
around 50 people at Pitcairn Island, and the
United States retained numerous Pacific island
dependencies mainly north of the Equator).
Immediately after World War II, France took
early steps towards extending greater autonomy
and even independence to its overseas posses-
sions. These included decentralization provided
for at the 1944 Brazzaville Conference; the
provisions for self-administration and represen-
tation in the French Assembly and Senate for
overseas possessions in the 1946 Constitution;
and the right to vote and further self-
administration in the 1956 Defferre Law. These
efforts culminated in referenda throughout the
French empire in 1958, in the context of the 1958
Constitution’s promising concept of ‘‘democra-
tic evolution’’ ¢ such that, for the African
colonies, after initially opting to stay within the
then French ‘‘Communauté’’, all but one had
voted for independence by 1960. In the Pacific,
all three colonies elected to stay within the Repu-
blic in 1958 (New Caledonia with a vote of 98 %,
Wallis and Futuna 95 % and French Polynesia
64 %). But from then on, statutory provisions for
New Caledonia and French Polynesia were
fitful, providing and then retracting various
steps in the direction of greater autonomy. This
has involved ten statutes for New Caledonia
from 1956 to 1988, with the Matignon/Oudinot
and Nouméa Accords following in 1988 and
1998; and nine for French Polynesia from 1956
to 2007. The administration of tiny Wallis and
Futuna has been less contentious. It operates
today on the same Statute that was drawn up for
it in 1961. However, most of its population has
migrated to New Caledonia to find work, and
therefore whatever happens in New Caledonia
will have flow-on effects for this archipelago.
Although the United Nations was formed on
the basis of self-determination for all peoples
(Article 1 of its Charter), and France was one of
only five Permanent Members of its Security
Council, in 1947 France decided not to transmit
information to the United Nations about its
Pacific possessions, claiming that only the New
Hebrides (which it administered jointly with Bri-
tain) was not self-governing (see  list of Trust
and Non-self governing territories at  web-
site). France ignored the establishment of the
UN Decolonization Committee in 1961 and
resisted the successful campaign by the Pacific
Islands governments to have New Caledonia
re-inscribed with the Committee as a non-self-
governing territory in 1986, in  Resolution
41/41A. It was only in 2004 that France, without
publicity, began reporting as Administering
Authority for New Caledonia (Communication,
 official, 2008).
Meanwhile, French Polynesia acquired a new
strategically important status for France after
1966 with the first nuclear test at its Moruroa
atoll. France had moved its testing program
there after it had lost its testing ground closer to
home in Algeria, after a bitter war resulted in the
independence of that former French colony. The
nuclear testing program was fundamental in
maintaining France’s status as a nuclear nation,
and its defence policy of national self-reliance
after the humiliations of the World Wars.
The twin French policy approaches to nuclear
testing in the Pacific and to decolonization
demands in its Pacific territories led to mounting
regional opposition. Denied by France of the
possibility of discussing these concerns in the
Nouméa-based South Pacific Commission, now
Secretariat for the Pacific Community () (see
Henningham, 1992: 197), the island countries
formed a new regional organization in 1971, the
South Pacific Forum, known from 2000 as the
Pacific Islands Forum (). The new grouping
formed the core of regional and increasingly
international opposition to French policies in
the Pacific.
By the 1980s, unmet decolonization demands
in New Caledonia had erupted into civil war
there, and opposition to the nuclear issue, inclu-
ding within French Polynesia, had accelerated.
The regional campaign of opposition was in full
swing. Tentative early efforts by France to pla-
cate regional leaders through what was essen-
tially a public relations campaign, sufficiently to
ease the international heat on France, failed. It
was only by the late 1990s, after France had
implemented policy change in both areas of
contention that the region began to soften its
approach to France’s presence. After a tempo-
rary suspension France ceased nuclear testing in
French Polynesia entirely in 1996. And it had
negotiated the Matignon/Oudinot Accords with
the principal New Caledonian political grou-
pings in 1988, deferring a referendum on inde-
pendence until 1998, and subsequently deferred
it again with the Nouméa Accord in 1998. That
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Accord provided for a scheduled handover of
many responsibilities to a locally elected govern-
ment in New Caledonia before a promised
referendum process on accession to full sover-
eignty, from 2014 to 2018, backed up by specific
provisions in the French Constitution (Articles
76-77).
With the ending of nuclear testing, French
Polynesia ceased to have the strategic impor-
tance it had acquired after 1966. At the same
time, with the Nouméa Accord’s specifically
scheduled handovers of responsibilities and
referendum process, New Caledonia became
something of a model for French Polynesia and
even other French overseas possessions (Fisher,
2012a: 5). Moreover New Caledonia was the
wealthiest of France’s overseas possessions, hol-
ding vast reserves of nickel, enabling it to meet
increased demand for that mineral from China
and India, and was assessed as having large off-
shore hydrocarbon resources (Vially et al., 2003).
By early this century, New Caledonia had displa-
ced French Polynesia as the pre-eminent French
Pacific entity.
At the same time as France was implementing
significant policy change within its Pacific collec-
tivities, it embarked on a series of measures to
engage more productively in the region. Presi-
dent Chirac initiated triennial Oceanic Summits
between the French and Pacific Islands Forum
government leaders, from 2003. France built on
its 1993 Arrangement with Australia and New
Zealand to provide emergency assistance and
fisheries surveillance to regional islands states. It
became engaged in a series of defence exchanges
and exercises involving regional forces, including
not only from Australia and New Zealand, but
from Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Tonga, and
Fiji.
France ‘‘in’’ but not ‘‘of’’ the Pacific
Its extensive history and recent efforts to res-
pond to regional concerns and pressures from
within its Pacific entities demonstrate that
France wanted to remain ‘‘in’’ the Pacific. But
anacademic debate that arose amidst the
controversies of the 1980s pointed to certain
limitations to France’s regional presence and
acceptance. Many analyses and official com-
ments at the time made a distinction between
France being ‘‘in’’ the Pacific and its being ‘‘of’’
the Pacific.
The debate was ironically stimulated by
France itself claiming to be part of the Pacific
(see below), as it embarked in the mid-1980s on a
campaign to improve its image in the region in
the wake of the serious regional opposition to its
policies of nuclear testing in French Polynesia,
and handling of independence demands in New
Caledonia. This was before the French State had
implemented concrete policy change, but rather
focused on public relations efforts, even while it
implemented aggressive policies such as blowing
up a vessel, the Rainbow Warrior, belonging
to Greenpeace lobbyists in New Zealand’s
Auckland harbour in 1985.
At the time, there was a certain ambiguity in
France’s view of itself in the region. French
writer Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, noting that
France’s French Pacific entities then returned
little revenue to the motherland, underlined that
a principal benefit was that they ‘‘allowed France
to be present in the Pacific’’ (my italics) (Coutau-
Bégarie, 1987: 286). Georges Ordonnaud, the
same year, described France as ‘‘a riveraine
power of the Pacific’’ through the three territo-
ries there, and foresaw France as ‘‘a riveraine and
allied nation which it will be natural to find in the
South Pacific and whose strength will support all
co-responsible nations’’ (Ordonnaud, 1987: 43,
46). In 1989 Australian-based academics Robert
Aldrich and John Connell in their France in
World Politics explored the duality, ambiguity
and paradoxes of France’s global territory, wri-
ting that France saw itself as the only ‘‘tropical
European power’’ claiming sovereign indige-
nous power in the Atlantic, Caribbean, Pacific
and Indian Oceans’’ (Aldrich and Connell, 1989:
Ch. 7, 164). But some French officials went fur-
ther. One of President Mitterrand’s foreign
policy advisors, Regis Debray, speaking as Secre-
tary General of France’s High Council for the
Pacific in 1987, demanded that France’s right
‘‘as a member of the Pacific family, on an equal
footing, be recognized’’ (in Chesneaux, 1987a:
1). Later, in 1996, a senior Foreign Affairs offi-
cial told the National Assembly that France was
‘‘a power of the Pacific’’ (Assemblée nationale,
1996: 43).
It was these assertions that set off something
of a debate. Pacific leaders did not respond
publicly or directly to the claims. They simply
retained their opposition to French policies
(only modifying them after substantial policy
change by France, see Regional response section
below). And some French and regional writers
addressed the question, not only in the latter
1980s and mid-1990s, but also well after the
Matignon/Oudinot Accords were signed in New
Caledonia and after the cessation of nuclear
testing in French Polynesia in 1996.
188 SOCIÉTÉ DES OCÉANISTES
France the outsider
Two writers at the time of Debray’s ‘‘Pacific
family’’ statement, one French and one Austra-
lian, were avidly opposed to France’s nuclear
testing policy, which was the primary context of
their commentary, and led them both to
conclude that France could never be part of the
South Pacific simply by virtue of its nuclear
testing there.
The first, French writer Jean Chesneaux,
wrote in 1987, before France had stopped
nuclear testing. He acknowledged the undispu-
ted sovereignty of France ‘‘in’’ the Pacific, its
permanent presence in its collectivities, and its
rights over extensive Exclusive Economic Zones
there (these are the zones extending beyond sho-
relines, agreed between nations under the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention). But he argued
that France was fundamentally an outsider
there. He highlighted the inconsistency of
France’s commitment to nuclear deterrence,
with Pacific policies of a nuclear free Pacific. The
Pacific Islands Forum countries had long
opposed any kind of nuclear testing in the
region, the Cook Islands and Western Samoa
assemblies passing resolutions against it even
before they were independent, in 1956, and the
Forum agreeing on a South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty in Raratonga in 1985. Chesneaux
argued that, while nuclear testing ensured
France’s status as a nuclear power, it did not
make it a Pacific nuclear power. He referred to
the irony of France’s global nuclear strategy,
with its objectives defined thousands of kilome-
ters away, being based on a technical presence in
the Pacific, in ‘‘splendid isolation’’. Perhaps
extrapolating from ideas about the wider Pacific
at the time, he also questioned the reigning ideas
France adduced about the Pacific: that the Paci-
fic was the centre of the world, a kind of techno-
logical ‘‘el dorado’’, a theatre of Soviet-US
confrontation, of French-Anglo rivalry, and of
peaceful island communities subject to the cove-
tous greed of Australia and New Zealand; and
even the persistent romanticized South Pacific
cultural idea leftover from French celebrities
such as Pierre Loti and Paul Gauguin, all of
which he said were ghosts and myths and not
very coherent by the mid-1980s (Chesneaux,
1987b: 131-132, 208-213). He was suggesting
that this idea of the Pacific did not reflect the
reality, a reality France did not want to confront
at the time.
Together with Australian writer Nic
Maclellan, who was an equally voluble critic of
France’s nuclear policy, Chesneaux remained
unforgiving even when writing well after France
had ceased its nuclear testing in French Polyne-
sia. In 1998, Maclellan and Chesneaux saw
France as ignoring the sense of regionalism, of
belonging to the South Pacific, that made the
settler states in Australia and New Zealand part
of the region, as much as France remained ‘‘an
outsider’’. They noted that opposition to nuclear
testing was not so much due to quantitative
measures of distance but to a qualitative politi-
cal and cultural unity that had developed in the
region. They made the harsh judgments that it
was impossible for France, after nuclear testing,
to be anything other than an outsider:
«After Moruroa, France can intervene in Pacific
affairs, can make a valuable contribution. But it can-
not be part of the region - it can only participate from
outside the region, as others do [...] France can no
longer pretend to be a power of the Pacific, but must
act as a power in the Pacific.» (Maclellan and
Chesneaux, 1998: 194, 240)
Still, even Chesneaux conceded that, while
France was an outsider, it was nonetheless a
longstanding outsider, and as such had an
ongoing role in the region particularly in the
provision of aid (Chesneaux, 1987a: 17).
In his paper on France and the South Pacific
island countries, Australian writer Stephen
Bates too saw France as an outsider. He argued
that, as in the past, France’s approach to Pacific
matters would primarily be dictated by its
own national interests, and its interests within
Europe. Crucial decisions about the South
Pacific would continue to be made on the other
side of the globe.
Bates warned about this, noting that ‘‘in any
conflict between its national security interests
in Europe and regional interest in the South
Pacific, the former will inevitably take prece-
dence’’ (Bates, 1997: 137-138). Because of this,
France could do and say things that seemed
incomprehensible to people in the Pacific. Bates
used the example of France during the vexed
1980s, telling the Pacific island states to stay out
of its internal affairs over New Caledonia and
French Polynesia, and yet seeing no inconsis-
tency in sending agents to New Zealand to
attack a ship in its harbor (the Rainbow Warrior
affair).
A further strand in the debate was the identi-
fication of a tendency of France to distinguish
itself from Anglo-Saxon ways of thinking as
a factor contributing to France being seen as
an outsider. This tendency is deeply rooted in
the rivalries France entered into with other
European powers, principally but not solely the
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British, over centuries of exploration and settle-
ment. In the twentieth century this kind of thin-
king was extrapolated to extend to Australia and
New Zealand.
French Admiral Sanguinetti in 1985 referred
to the role of French/Anglo-Saxon rivalry in
justifying France’s continued presence in the
region (Sanguinetti, 1985: 32). Robert Aldrich in
a critique of French geopolitical analysis at the
time refers to the idea of an ‘‘Anglo-Saxon cons-
piracy’’ (Aldrich, 1988: 65). Regional writer
Miriam Dornoy-Vuroburavu began her 1994
essay on Perceptions of France in the South
Pacific with the observation that France was
«essentially a European power and partner with
expertise, not a Pacific country». She proceeded
to illustrate this by examples of a particularly
French way of thinking, citing the French Minis-
ter for Cooperation in 1975 saying that France
must be present everywhere in the world, «where
her thinkers’ genius has given her a place without
any relation to her demography or resources»;
President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing saying
‘‘France is what is best’’; President Mitterrand
referring to ‘‘ this indefinable genius’’ of France;
and de Gaulle himself saying ‘‘our action aims at
linking objectives, which, because they are
French, answer the needs of all men’’ (Dornoy-
Vuroburavu, 1994: 1). Regis Debray is once
again cited as applying this kind of thinking to
the Pacific, saying in 1986 ‘‘To demilitarise the
Pacific would deprive it of Francophonie’’ (op.
cit.: 3). Dornoy-Vuroburavu described Australia
at the time as considering itself as a Pacific
country, and considering France as an external
power (op. cit.: 15), which was certainly reflected
in Australia’s participation in the  in the
1980s, when the Australian government worked
to moderate intra regional pressure opposing
French nuclear testing policies, acknowledging
France’s role as a nuclear power and western ally
(see comments on this moderating role in Regio-
nal Response section below).
Maclellan and Chesneaux wrote about
France’s tendency to attribute opposition to it
and its policies variously to imperialist ambi-
tions of the Anglo-Saxon countries Australia
and New Zealand, or even to a ‘conspiracy’ of
customary law of the Pacific islands and the
Biblical morality of the London missionaries
(Maclellan and Chesneaux, 1998: 193). The
accusations cut both ways: at the end of her
concise monograph on Australian and French
‘‘mutual misunderstandings’’ in the Pacific,
Martine Piquet, having suggested that France
‘‘never claimed to be a South Pacific nation’’,
gives way to frustration when she attributes some
of the Australian attitudes to France as ‘‘some-
thing about loving to hate the French’’ (Piquet,
2000: 8, 29). The emotive reciprocal perceptions
at the time are outlined also by Mohamed-
Gaillard (2009).
These kinds of comments should be regarded
in the context of the visceral opposition at the
time to specific French policies.
France the outsider and insider by virtue of its
Pacific collectivities
French political scientist Isabelle Cordonnier
took the debate further, perhaps in a more pro-
ductive direction, writing in 1995 that, while the
French collectivities themselves were seen by
Pacific island states as part of the region, conti-
nental France (the ‘‘métropole’’) was not. It was
in this context that she saw Tjibaou’s comment
to Lafleur of 1983, cited at the beginning of this
paper, ‘‘We are from here and nowhere else; you
are from here but also from somewhere else’’: in
South Pacific eyes, you are an insider if you come
from there and nowhere else. She saw Australia
and New Zealand, implicitly with indigenous
populations from there and nowhere else, as insi-
ders but France as not.
Cordonnier saw these differences as explai-
ning some of the critical ambiguities in French
policy, for example, how it could support nuclear
testing in the region as an instrument of France’s
grandeur and status as a middle global power, in
the face of negative perceptions in the region
based on fear that testing would provoke a spiral
of terror in case of nuclear war (Cordonnier,
1995: 20-25).
Persistence of the Idea of France the outsider
And yet not only did the idea of France as an
outsider persist beyond the cessation of nuclear
testing and the signature of the 1988 Matignon/
Oudinot Accords addressing New Caledonia’s
decolonization issues, as evident in the foregoing
citations. The idea has persisted as a kind of
default perception into the 2000s and even to the
present.
In 2005, still referring to France’s nuclear poli-
cies, regional anti-nuclear commentator Nic
Maclellan wrote that the ‘‘sense of belonging ¢
of looking to the skies, seeing the Southern
Cross, and feeling at home ¢ underlies much of
the regional opposition to France’s nuclear
policy’’, and he said this emotion against ‘‘outsi-
ders’’ from Paris rang just as true in Australia
and New Zealand as in the Islands. He noted
that even in 2005, nine years after the cessation
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of testing, the nuclear issue was not closed, with
continuing issues such as dumping of waste;
passage of waste ships; uranium mining; testing
of missile defence satellite systems threatening
the multilateralism of space; and issues over the
long-term effects of past nuclear testing, where
French positions were at odds with those of the
Pacific (Maclellan, 2005: 365). (It is notable that,
perhaps aware of its responsibilities, in April
2009, France announced compensation measu-
res for those whose health had been affected by
its testing in the Pacific, potentially covering
150,000 former workers, and on terms which
removed the prior onus on the worker to prove
cause [Flash d’Océanie, 1 July 2009].)
In 2008 book based on her 2006 thesis, Natha-
lie Mrgudovic noted that whereas France had
seen itself as a power ‘‘of’’ the South Pacific until
the end of the 1980s, it had since tended to claim
simply to be ‘‘in’’ the Pacific, while working for
the integration of its entities in ‘‘their’’ region
(Mrgudovic, 2008: 37, 240).
Australian journalist, Graeme Dobell, writing
in 2007 about China’s activities in the region,
lumped France along with China and Japan as
external powers or outside players who acted as
though they wanted a stake in the region (Dobell,
2007: 9). As recently as 2009, one prominent
Australian think tank had made tentative plans
to convene a regional conference on ‘‘outside
powers’’ in the Pacific, which it spelled out in its
flyers as France, China and Japan. In 2009, Aus-
tralia’s Defence White Paper similarly made no
mention of France as a resident Pacific power. It
mentioned France along with other  coun-
tries such as Spain, Germany, Italy and Sweden,
as a cooperative European partner, with a brief
reference to practical cooperation in the Pacific
and Southern Oceans and Afghanistan; and as a
donor in the South Pacific to support capacity
building (Defence, 2009: 98,100).
The comments outline above demonstrate the
strength of emotion that was aroused by
France’s nuclear and decolonization policies at
the time, and the persistence of the perception
that France is an outsider ‘‘in’’ the region rather
than a sovereign long-term presence ‘‘of’’ the
region, a status that some French leaders had
sought to claim.
However the discussion flags some possi-
bilities for change: first, by French leaders
themselves even wanting to be seen as ‘‘of’’ the
region enough to risk that assertion amidst
the hostile emotions of the time; second, by the
trend over time towards acceptance that
the French collectivities in the Pacific were ‘‘of’’
the Pacific, even if France was not; and third, by
Tjibaou’s own comment accepting that France
was ‘‘of’’ New Caledonia even if it was also ‘‘of’’
somewhere else, that is, a concession towards
France by the indigenous pro-independence lea-
der with the most at stake at the time.
Regional response to France
With France’s ending of nuclear testing in
the Pacific, and the 1998 Nouméa Accord
signed, regional Pacific countries did begin
to unbend in their treatment of France. They
responded well to French initiatives. They have
participated in the triennial regional Oceanic
Summits, initiated by President Chirac, in
Papeete in 2003, in Paris in 2006 and in Nouméa
in 2009, although the level of attendance at the
latter suffered, particularly when France’s
President Sarkozy was unable to attend. They
have participated in France’s programs of deve-
lopment and defence cooperation, and have
welcomed France’s contribution to monitoring
and sharing fisheries surveillance intelligence
through the trilateral  arrangement.
Pacific Islands Forum leaders have also pro-
gressively warmed towards accepting the three
French Pacific entities into their fold, rewarding
French policy change, by according Observer
status to New Caledonia in 1999 after the Nou-
méa Accord was signed, and French Polynesia in
2004 after French statutory reforms there. They
created a special category, Associate Member,
for these two entities in 2006, when they admit-
ted Wallis and Futuna as an Observer. The
French entities are all members of the ,
and members of many of the technical regional
organisations. One or more of the French collec-
tivities are represented in some way on seven
of the ten inter-governmental members of
the Council of Regional Organizations of the
Pacific (): the Secretariat for the Pacific
Community, the South Pacific Regional
Environment Program, the South Pacific Ap-
plied Geoscience Commission, the Pacific
Islands Development Program, the South
Pacific Tourism Organisation, the Forum
Fisheries Agency and the Pacific Power
Association. All three entities, however, do not
participate in all these organizations at the
moment. There are only three  bodies in
which the French Pacific collectivities are not
represented: the University of the South Pacific,
the Fiji School of Medicine, and the South
Pacific Board for Education Assessment.
But even to the present, the Pacific Islands
Forum governments have retained a reserve
towards France and even the French
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collectivities. They have maintained their annual
United Nations General Assembly resolution
keeping New Caledonia under the ongoing
examination of the Committee of 24 (see for
example  Resolution A/Res/66/87: 12
January 2012). When they were putting together
the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon
Islands in 2003 under the  Biketawa Declara-
tion on collective regional security, they resisted
early Australian efforts to include France. In the
event, regional island leaders, sounded out infor-
mally in the corridors of a meeting hosted by
the Australian Government in Sydney to plan
the Mission, were not responsive to the idea of
French participation, and the idea was dropped,
(Communication from then Foreign Minister
Alexander Downer, 2009). While welcoming the
French entities as Associate members, they have
stopped short of agreeing to New Caledonia’s
wish, expressed in 2010, to become a full mem-
ber of the Forum. In the 2010 Summit Commu-
niqué they referred to New Caledonia’s wish, but
simply noted that the Nouméa Accord ‘‘self-
determination’’ process itself would resolve the
question of New Caledonia’s international stan-
ding, and welcomed further engagement with
the Forum, including by a visiting Forum mis-
sion to New Caledonia (such visits were to take
place regularly to evaluate Nouméa Accord
implementation but have not taken place since
2004, although a separate Melanesian Spea-
rhead Group visited in 2010, see below) (
Communiqué, 2010). They made no mention of
New Caledonian membership in their 2011
Communiqué, even though France had
expressed its support for full membership only a
few weeks before. In Paris, on 1 September,
Minister for Overseas France, Marie-Luce
Penchard, had supported the formal request by
New Caledonian President Harold Martin at a
meeting of Ambassadors to countries adjoining
the French Overseas collectivities (Flash d’Océa-
nie, 8 September 2011). Again in 2012 the  did
not refer to the wishes of France and New Cale-
donia for full membership for New Caledonia.
Melanesian Pacific islands leaders resisted
tentative efforts by France in 2009 to have New
Caledonia replace the  as a full member of
the Melanesian Spearhead Group ().
Philippe Gomès, then President of New Caledo-
nia, expressed this wish in October 2009 (Flash
d’Oceanie, 19 January 2010), which was rejected
by  spokesman Tutogoro (Les Nouvelles
calédoniennes, 19 February 2010, and see Makin,
2010). The  was formed in the mid 1980s
expressly to support the Kanak independence
movement and includes Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, the , and Fiji
from 1998. Although it has expanded its focus to
fostering economic links between Melanesian
countries, which are being consolidated, it has
maintained a watching role on New Caledonia
and the implementation of the Accord. Despite
France allowing the  to host a meeting of
the  in 2001, and inviting the  to visit New
Caledonia in June 2010, the  has retained a
critical stance. In 2003 the  Summit Commu-
niqué attached an annex expressing the ’s
concern at ‘‘the lack of implementation of
certain provisions of the Nouméa Accord, in
particular the electoral process and issues
relating to New Caledonia’s referendum
process’’. In 2009, the  signed the Kéamu
Declaration supporting the position of Vanuatu
over the disputed Matthew and Hunter islands
group which is claimed by France and Vanuatu.
And in June 2010, when it sent a visiting mission
to Nouméa, the  expressed continuing
concern at the slow rate of implementation of
Nouméa Accord commitments (May, 2011: 6,
Makin, op. cit.). A subsequent planned  visit
in 2011 was postponed because of objections by
some New Caledonian leaders to its being led by
controversial Fijian leader Bainimarama.
Against this background of reserve about
France’s position, it is notable that the  tur-
ned to China for funding when it wanted to
construct a secretariat building, which was com-
pleted in 2007. This is reminiscent of Vanuatu’s,
and New Caledonia’s Kanak independence sup-
porters, turning to Libya to put pressure on
regional countries to support their policy stances
on New Caledonian decolonization in the 1980s
(see for example Mrgudovic, 2008: 220-221 and
Mohamed-Gaillard, 2010: 230-234).
Pacific islands leaders have also been reticent
over the question of French Polynesian indepen-
dence demands. Pro-independence leader Oscar
Temaru is well known to many of them, over
many years. Since his party won the 2004 elec-
tions in French Polynesia, Temaru has been
frustrated by a combination of statutory change
sponsored by France, and floor-crossing and
personal politics involving pro-France parties
which have led to thirteen changes in govern-
ment to 2011. In April 2011 after yet another
no-confidence motion, Oscar Temaru became
President once more, for the fifth time in seven
years. He regularly calls for French Polynesia to
be listed as a non-self governing territory with
the  Decolonization Committee, particularly
on the eve of Pacific Islands Forum summits.
Forum leaders as a whole have tended not to take
a position on this question, but have instead in
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their Communiqués consistently urged France
and French Polynesia to work together for
French Polynesia’s self-determination. Once
again, in 2011, the Forum leaders ‘‘recalled their
2004 decision to support the principle of French
Polynesia’s right to self-determination. They
reiterated their encouragement to French Poly-
nesia and France to seek an agreed approach on
how to realize French Polynesia’s right to self-
determination’’ and in 2012 used similar words,
noting as well that the election of a new French
government opened fresh possibilities for a posi-
tive dialogue between the two ( Communiqué,
2011 and 2012).
An indication of the unease of many Pacific
islands leaders about the ongoing frustration of
electoral endorsements of pro-independence
leader Temaru in French Polynesia was the
public statement of support for French Polyne-
sia’s reinscription with the  Decolonization
Committee, by a number of them who met on
the eve of the 2011  summit. Fiji, Solomon
Islands, , Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Nauru, Tonga,
Timor Leste, Kiribati, Federated States of
Micronesia, Republic of Marshall Islands and
French Polynesia, met and signed a Communi-
qué indicating that ‘‘Leaders supported the
re-inscription of French Polynesia/Tahiti Nui on
the  Decolonization Committee’s list as the
first step in the process of self-determination, at
international level’’ (Nadi Communiqué, 2011).
The position of Pacific islands leaders, usually
expressed through the  Summit Communi-
qués and sub-regional groups such as the , is
not the same as that of Australia and New Zea-
land. Australia and New Zealand as western
allies have generally taken an approach more sup-
portive of France. For example, Australia
recently expressed official support for New Cale-
donia’s full membership of the  notwithstan-
ding the Forum’s reticence (Foreign Affairs and
Trade, 2010 and 2011). Even, or perhaps, espe-
cially, through the troubled 1980s, Australia and
New Zealand exerted a moderating influence on
Forum positions, notwithstanding domestic
opposition to French policies within each
country and France’s treatment of New Zealand
over the Rainbow Warrior affair. For example
Australia softened wording in  Communiqués
on New Caledonia; and Australia and New Zea-
land moderated the regional stance on nuclear
issues, finally expressed in the Raratonga Treaty
(Mrgudovic, 2008: 141, 149-150). This was
variously acknowledged by the then French
Foreign Minister (Assemblée nationale, 1985:
549-55); by Coutau-Bégarie (1987: 287); and in a
report to theNationalAssembly (Gonnot,1995).
Where to for France? French desire to remain ‘‘in’’
and ‘‘of’’ the Pacific
Despite the reticence of Pacific leaders,
and the persistence of the idea of France as
an outsider, it seems that France not only
wants to remain ‘‘in’’ the region, but it wants
once again to be seen to be ‘‘of’’ the region, and
indeed believes that it has secured regional
support for this.
There are few explicit public statements of
French policy objectives in the South Pacific
region. Indeed, France’s 2008 Defense White
Paper parallels Australia’s 2009 Paper cited
above, in the sense that it does not see France as
an insider in the Pacific region. The strategic
outlook set out in the Paper is entirely European.
The Pacific is mentioned only in references to
France’s own collectivities there and to domestic
defense arrangements located in them. It does
not speak of any strategic interests in the sur-
rounding Pacific area or of strategic reach
accruing by virtue of the sovereign resident
French presence in the Pacific. At one point it
even refers to the ‘‘éloignement’’ or isolation of
Asia, a decidedly non-Pacific perspective
(Défense, 2008).
Still, there are other pointers to the strategic
benefits accruing to France by virtue of its over-
seas possessions, including in the South Pacific.
The Pacific possessions contribute to France’s
national status as part of the string of French
possessions around the globe; provide strategic
ballast for France’s international roles in the
United Nations (including as one of the Security
Council’s five Permanent Members), the  and
; deliver real and potential commercial
return through New Caledonia’s nickel and
potential hydrocarbon resources and the exten-
sive Exclusive Economic Zones they represent
for France, making it the world’s second largest
maritime zone power (most of which is contribu-
ted by the French Pacific entities’ zones); and
represent a vast springboard for France’s scien-
tific research (see Fisher, in Neilson and Aldrich,
2011: 237-254). France’s global  extends to
11.57 million square kilometres, of which 7.3
million square kilometres derive from its Pacific
entities alone (and of that, just under 5 million
square kilometres from French Polynesia alone).
France’s continental Europe  is just 340 290
square kilometres (Faberon and Ziller, 2007: 9).
In speeches to the French Overseas posses-
sions in November 2009 and January 2010, then
President Sarkozy referred to some of these
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attributes of the overseas possessions as a whole.
In 2009 he noted France’s status as the second
maritime nation of the world with an Exclusive
Economic Zone equal to that of the United Sta-
tes; as a premier space and nuclear power, and
one with major diplomatic influence over
oceans, and unrivalled biodiversity, all owing
directly to the Overseas France (Sarkozy, 2009).
In 2010, he said that it was thanks to these
overseas entities that France was ‘‘La France des
trois océans’’ ¢ France ‘‘of the three oceans’’. In a
way, he was saying that France is ‘‘of’’ the Pacific
Ocean as much as of the Atlantic and Indian
Oceans in which other French possessions lie. He
also said that people from the overseas entities
contributed to France’s identity, participating in
‘‘our influence, our grandeur and our power’’.
In the same speech, while signaling flexibility
in developing political institutions appropriate
to each of the diverse French Overseas posses-
sions, Sarkozy defined a «‘red line’ [...] never [...]
to be breached, that of independence. The Over-
seas [France] are French and will remain
French» (Sarkozy, 2010). More specifically rela-
ting to the South Pacific, in August 2011,
Sarkozy publicly expressed his preference for
New Caledonia to remain within France
(Sarkozy, 2011).
France’s Economic, Social and Environment
Council, an ongoing advisory body, made
recommendations in early May 2012 based on
a judgement that the Overseas possessions
represented «a strategic asset for France and the
European Union, which should be better used as
a catalyst for regional development» ( Projet
d’avis, 9 May 2012). The Council elaborated that
France represented the second largest maritime
zone, and was the only State in the world
represented in each of the three oceans, thanks
to its overseas possessions, which as such
represented strategic assets.
To the time of writing, the stance of François
Hollande, elected President in April 2012, on the
strategic value of the Overseas French posses-
sions had not been specifically articulated.
However as a candidate he indicated that he
wanted the overseas portfolio to answer to the
Prime Minister’s office rather than the Interior
Ministry (see Le Figaro, 17 January 2012) and he
has since his election, elevated the portfolio from
Secretary of State to full Minister. In his first
public speech, he said that wherever the French
lived, in the hexagon or Overseas, ‘‘we are a
France reunited in one same community of des-
tiny’’, while promising to revive ‘‘local demo-
cracy’’. On the question of New Caledonia, as a
candidate he did not indicate a preference for
the future but simply indicated that «the choice
was that of the archipelago’s voters alone»
(L’Express, 13 April 2012).
The idea of France being part of the Pacific
family (therefore ‘‘of’’ the Pacific) has also been
revived in recent years. Then Overseas France
Minister Estrosi told Pacific islands government
leaders at the 2007 post Forum summit that
France was the only European member country
directly present ‘‘in’’ the Pacific. He said that the
preceding 2006 Oceanic Summit with South
Pacific leaders in Paris had been based on a
simple idea, that France, by virtue of its three
collectivities, was part of ‘‘this great Pacific
family’’, a wonderful opportunity for France. A
year later, former Prime Minister Michel Rocard
wrote that France had moved from the detested
colonising power that detonated bombs in the
Pacific to a status more like a ‘‘big sister’’ to the
region, rejecting arbitrary dominations, accom-
panying ‘‘its former territories’’ in their progress
towards autonomy much to the ‘‘relief’’ of the
bigger powers Australia and New Zealand. The
Pacific Islands Forum, he said, while it had been
explicitly created to shun France in the region,
had become one ‘‘of the firmest defenders and
even seekers of our presence’’ (in Mrgudovic,
2008: 13-15), although this statement does not
seem to fit with the current regional approach to
France outlined in the preceding section.
This idea of being a big sister to the region
continues the ambiguity about its role that was
evident in the 1980s and 1990s: France wanting
to project itself as one of the family, but ever
conscious of its larger power status.
Despite the ambiguities, it seems from the
foregoing that France definitely wants to remain
‘‘in’’ the Pacific and may even be beginning to
perceive itself once again as being ‘‘of’’ the
region, which can on its own be seen as a positive
development, representing an acknowledgement
of the strategic importance and benefits to
France of its collectivities and regional presence,
and perhaps motivating France to secure a long-
term place in the region. At the same time, this
paper has noted that the idea of France being an
outsider in the region is a persistent one in the
region itself, and that Pacific Island leaders are
maintaining a reserve before accepting France
fully into the region.
Some of the trends of the evolving France:
‘‘in’’ or ‘‘of’’ the region debate point to the pos-
sibility of convergence of interests between
France, its collectivities and Pacific islands
countries.
194 SOCIÉTÉ DES OCÉANISTES
Future status of the French collectivities
A first such pointer, from the debate from the
1980s and 1990s, and especially from Cordon-
nier’s views, is the evolution of the idea that
France’s collectivities (if not the motherland) are
already largely accepted as being part of the
region. And as noted the pre-eminent regional
Forum, the , has welcomed the collectivities in
new but limited forms of association, flagging
that their future status in the organisation will be
determined after the playing-out of the Nouméa
Accord process in New Caledonia, while in the
meantime expecting France and French Polyne-
sia to cooperate on self-determination issues in
that entity.
These developments represent a democratic
springboard from which France can consolidate
its own long-term status, regardless of whether
the collectivities move towards independence
or, as seems more likely, remain with France.
The region has signaled that it will be important
that France handle well the issues relating to
autonomy and independence demands in its
collectivities. This means in French Polynesia,
that France implement statutory change in a fair
and unbiased way, and not ignore the role of the
United Nations in future outcomes.
But because New Caledonia is now the pre-
eminent French Pacific collectivity, seen largely
as setting the pace for French Polynesia and with
the role of principal employer of those from
Wallis and Futuna; and because of the inbuilt
timetables and regional support for the Nouméa
Accord, the single most important thing France
can do to secure a long-term place for itself in the
region, is to implement fully and honourably its
commitments under the Nouméa Accord.
Bearing in mind that the final outcomes of the
Accord coincide with significant regional deve-
lopments, and at a time of change in strategic
balances in the broader Pacific, France and the
major parties in New Caledonia could benefit
from taking regional leaders more into their
confidence about the steps they are taking to
define the future of New Caledonia. In this way,
France and New Caledonian leaders would be
acting in the spirit of the  notion of regional
consensus and collective security as reflected in
the Forum’s Biketawa Agreement, and proving
themselves as worthwhile potential full members
of the .
France could also become more open to
accepting visits to New Caledonia by the Pacific
Islands Forum Ministerial Committee tasked
with monitoring implementation of the Nouméa
Accord. It should continue to support a role for
the Melanesian Spearhead Group as a vehicle
for regional engagement in the Nouméa Accord
process, as it has done by hosting meetings of the
Group in Nouméa and welcoming a visit by an
 mission in July 2010. France should accept
that the  would continue to represent New
Caledonia in the  at least until after Nouméa
Accord processes are complete (i.e. after 2018).
Sharing with regional leaders the successes
and difficulties associated with implementing the
Accord to date will be helpful in securing regio-
nal support for a future negotiated settlement in
New Caledonia. With three years remaining
before the final referendum process begins, the
fact is that the record so far in implementing the
Accord is mixed, perhaps not surprisingly in
view of the complexities (see Fisher, 2012b;
Muckle, 2009: 190-191; Anaya, 2011; and com-
ments by Natapei, in Makin, 2010). On the plus
side, new and complex institutions have been
created including provincial assemblies, an
entity-wide Congress and collegial (all-inclusive)
Government executive, elected peacefully for
three 5-year terms from 1999; an innovative idea
of New Caledonian citizenship with special
voting and employment protection rights; and
institutions including a Customary Senate
amongst others as vehicles for indigenous
inputs on pertinent legislation, land, language
and cultural matters. Economic re-balancing is
occurring, with two massive new nickel projects
under way, one in the Northern Province now
run by pro-independence Kanak parties, and
one more in the mainly European pro-France
administered Southern Province, together invol-
ving investments backed up by French State tax
exemptions and other support, totaling more
than $US 6 billion. But progress in these projects
and the economic re-balancing they represent,
have been negatively affected by the global finan-
cial crisis and complex local issues. And on the
minus side, France has been seen as unhelpful
and partisan in its handling of sensitive issues
such as a restricted electorate, ethnicity ques-
tions in censuses, and immigration from other
parts of France. There have been perceptions
that France has acted pre-emptively by construc-
ting a major military headquarters complex in
Nouméa in 2008 and in seeking support for use
of the Euro in New Caledonia after it became
French currency in 2002, when the Nouméa
Accord specifically provides for defence and
currency (as two of five ‘‘sovereign’’ respon-
sibilities) only to be considered after 2014.
The timetable of handing over some im-
portant powers such as secondary education has
slipped.
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France and New Caledonian authorities,
by explaining their progress and problems,
will win the further respect and support of regio-
nal island neighbours for a kind of collegial
government that does not exist elsewhere in the
Pacific.
Aid to the region
Second, the debate in the 1980s and 1990s
pointed to the obligation on France, even if only
seen as present ‘‘in’’ the region, to contribute to
the development of the region. This presents
another opportunity for France, particularly if it
genuinely wants to be seen to be more ‘‘of’’ the
region. France has already delivered a certain
amount of aid to the region (see below), and,
importantly, has encouraged and supported 
aid inflows to the region as well. France was
largely responsible for the introduction of the
’s Overseas Countries and Territories pro-
gram and the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific pro-
grams which overarch  support for the French
Pacific entities, for the independent island eco-
nomies, and engagement with the  (for fur-
ther background, see Fisher, 2012c). But these
amounts are relatively modest, especially when
compared with what France spends in its Pacific
collectivities.  support for Pacific island
governments through the Tenth European Deve-
lopment Fund 2008-2003 averages $A 90 million
a year (European Commission, 2007: 7 and
Fisher, 2012c). Official figures for French aid
have varied in recent years and are unclear as to
whether or not they include assistance through
the . The most generous interpretation points
to France having spent Euros 103 million or $A
163 million in 2008 on bilateral aid to the Pacific
(Affaires étrangères, 2009), while it spent around
$A 4 billion in its three South Pacific entities
alone, excluding Clipperton (, 2008: 960;
French High Commission, 2007; , 2009).
And France does not see the Pacific as a priority
region for its development cooperation. France’s
2011Strategy statement on cooperation to develo-
pment does not even mention Pacific countries. It
identifies as priorities for assistance sub-Saharan
Africa (60 %), the Mediterranean (20 %), coun-
tries in crisis (10 %), and ‘‘emerging countries’’
(10 %), with ‘‘other countries and regions’’ being
covered under  and multilateral arrangements
‘‘with limited budget cost’’ (Affaires étrangères
et européennes, 2011: 8).
ThereremainsscopeforFrancetoprovidemore
development cooperation to the South Pacific,
and to identify them as regional neighbors,
drawingontheexpertise initsownPacificcollecti-
vities in the areas such as fisheries, sustainable
development, mineral exploitation, in genuinely
mutualexchanges.FrancecouldbuildonitsFonds
Pacifique, the Fund it set up in 1986 which in
recent years targets linkages between its three
Pacific entities and their regional neighbours,
with funding of around Euros 2 million a year.
By identifying and funding a higher priority
for the Pacific region in its development coope-
ration program, France would demonstrate its
ongoing interest in the region, and shore up
support there for its future presence, regardless
of the democratic outcomes on the future status
of its Pacific collectivities.
Retaining a Pacific focus
Third, Stephen Bates and the 1980s and 90s
‘‘in’’/ ‘‘of’’ debate showed the risks for France in
taking its eye of the Pacific ball as it focuses,
properly, on its other priorities, as a major Euro-
pean and  power. It has been seen that some
French decisions were bad for the region (and in
turn for France’s own international image),
partly because they were based on France’s
European priorities in very specific areas. The
most important example was its nuclear testing
policy. But there are particular examples in New
Caledonia’s recent history where French natio-
nal priorities dictated local policy with disas-
trous results locally and regionally. The clearest
example was the ill-advised French raid on a cave
in New Caledonia in 1988, after frustrated
Kanak independentists had killed four French
police and held others hostage. The decision to
undertake the raid, which resulted in twenty-one
more deaths, occurred as competing French can-
didates Chirac and Mitterrand sought to be seen
to be making strong decisions, since the event
took place between two rounds of voting for the
French Presidency (graphically depicted in
Mathieu Kassovitz’ 2011 film L’Ordre et la
Morale3). A more recent example was the effort
to accelerate delicate discussions on the sensitive
flag issue in New Caledonia, partly to prepare for
senior visits from mainland France, risking com-
promising hard-won collegial arrangements
within the fledgling New Caledonian govern-
ment (see Fisher, 2011 and 2012b).
3. . ¢ See also JSO 134, Leblic, « Le film de Mathieu Kassovitz, L’Ordre et la morale. Quand la fiction se confronte à la
réalité » (pp. 111-120) and Faurie et Nayral, « L’Ordre et la morale : quand l’industrie du cinéma bouscule la coutume kanak »
(pp. 121-136).
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It will be important for France to continue to
post as its most senior representatives in the
French Pacific entities, individuals with expe-
rience in and deep knowledge of the South Paci-
fic region. There is also scope for France to
tighten its administrative structures in Paris, to
be sure all agencies are working together but
with an understanding of regional needs. Given
the importance of developments in New Caledo-
nia in the next few years, this could mean
strengthening the South Pacific unit within
the Overseas France ministry, and improving
inter-agency coordinating mechanisms in Paris,
setting up an ongoing steering group engaging
other government departments, such as Foreign
Affairs, rather than ad hoc management as
occurs now.
As evident in the omissions from its 2008
Defence White Paper and 2011 Cooperation to
Development Strategy, there is scope for France
to reflect, in its strategic planning at the highest
levels, the way in which it wants to be seen in the
Pacific.
Gallic v. Ango-Saxon distinction
Fourth, the idea of a Anglo-Saxon v. Gallic
distinction which recurred in the early debate
was a factor limiting France’s acceptance in the
region. Officially France has already made a
number of changes which signal its awareness
that these types of distinctions are not helpful.
For example, it is increasingly conducting its
defence exercises with Australia and other regio-
nal partners in English. It is increasingly using
interpretation devices as a matter of course when
its delegations participate in regional forums,
rather than insisting upon the regional organisa-
tions using French as well as English not only for
all their meetings but for written publications as
well, as it has done in the  for over 70 years.
Further genuine efforts to enmesh its collec-
tivities in the wider life of the region will be
important. France’s continued sensitive diplo-
matic activity will be important, through regular
Oceanic Summits, engagement in regional struc-
tures such as the  (as a dialogue partner) and
 (as a founding member and donor), and
through its Embassies in the region (in Australia,
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and
Vanuatu) and as a major contributor to  acti-
vity there. However, greater support is needed for
the Pacific collectivities to develop their own
capacity to participate productively in their
own right in regional organisations, through
well-resourced external affairs units. Training in
English, in diplomatic practice, and in relevant
foreign affairs and trade matters will be
important, with specific measures to include
indigenous personnel. France has begun atta-
ching trainee diplomats from its Pacific entities
within French Embassies in the region, which is
a start but regional countries want to see the
entities represented in their own right. There is
also scope for two-way exchanges involving
personnel, including indigenous personnel, from
the French Pacific entities within for example the
foreign affairs and trade ministries of regional
islands governments.
Conclusion
Although it is over twenty years since his
assassination, the words of Kanak leader Jean-
Marie Tjibaou, when he described France as
being ‘‘of’’ or ‘‘from’’ the Pacific while also being
‘‘of’’ or ‘‘from’’ somewhere else, still provide ins-
piration for conciliatory change in the Pacific
region.
His statement provides an opportunity for
France to develop its relationship with the
Pacific from one of a resident sovereign State
‘‘in’’ the region, to a State truly ‘‘of’’ the region, a
relationship that could endure well beyond the
completion of the Nouméa Accord processes,
which had their origins in Tjibaou’s signature of
the Matignon/Oudinot Accords.
At a time when France is seeking to maintain
its claims in a changing world as one of the
only five privileged Permanent Five member of
the  Security Council, as it takes on new
leadership roles within , and consolidates
its leadership of the European Union, France is
increasingly beginning to acknowledge publicly,
if rarely and indirectly, the strategic weight that
accrues from its Pacific presence. It seems to be
beginning to identify benefits in projecting itself
as a power not only ‘‘in’’ but also ‘‘of’’ the South
Pacific Ocean. Hopefully, it will do so more
explicitly in its public strategic documents.
As the 1980s and 1990s debate showed, a
determining factor in achieving regional
acceptance as a country ‘‘of’’ the region will be
how France implements its commitments in
its Pacific collectivities, particularly in New
Caledonia under the Nouméa Accord as it times
out from 2014. Action by the French State in
other areas, such as development cooperation
and understanding Pacific perceptions as much
as European ones, will contribute to France
maintaining a respected place in the region
beyond the expected resolution of the status of
its collectivities.
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